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MANSLAUGHTER UNDER THE GRIFFITH CODE:  
ROWING NOT SO GENTLY DOWN TWO STREAMS OF LAW 
 
Ben White, Andrew Garwood-Gowers and Lindy Willmott1 
 
This article considers the two streams of law that can lead to a conviction for 
manslaughter under the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). The first stream deals with 
acts or conduct that cause another’s death in circumstances where that death 
is not an accident while the second covers those deaths caused by criminal 
negligence. The article considers how the two streams of law interrelate, and 
in particular, the extent to which both are available in the same case. Some of 
the inconsistencies identified by judges in relation to these streams of law are 




In R v Morgan, Thomas JA described “two separate streams of law” which 
may lead to a conviction for manslaughter under the Criminal Code 1899 
(Qld).2 The first stream deals with acts or conduct of an accused that cause 
another’s death in circumstances where that death is not an accident. The 
second stream embraces those deaths that occur due to the criminal 
negligence of the accused. Although how the two streams of law operate 
independently from each other seems relatively settled, some confusion has 
arisen about how they interrelate. In particular, there have been different 
views expressed as to the extent to which both streams of law are available in 
the same case and it is this topic that is the focus of this article. 
 
The article begins by outlining what the Crown is required to prove to secure a 
conviction for manslaughter under the two different streams of law. The duty 
imposed in relation to “dangerous things” under s 289 of the Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld)3 is used as an example when considering the stream that relies on 
criminal negligence. Particular mention is also made of s 23,4 which is 
available to an accused under one stream of law but not the other. The article 
                                            
1 Dr Ben White LLB (Hons) (QUT), DPhil (Oxon) is a Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland 
University of Technology; Andrew Garwood-Gowers BA (Qld), LLB (Hons) (Qld), LLM 
(Cantab); Lindy Willmott BCom (Qld), LLB (Hons) (Qld), LLM (Cantab) is an Associate 
Professor, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology. This article is based on a 
presentation delivered by two of the authors to the Queensland Supreme Court Judges 
Conference in April 2004. The authors are grateful to Justice Holmes, who chaired the 
presentation, for her assistance in formulating these thoughts and to Robert Sibley of the 
QUT Law Faculty for his comments. 
2 R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348 at [13]. 
3 Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 266. 
4 The Western Australian equivalent is Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 23. Although the focus of 
this article is on the provisions of the Queensland Code, the equivalent Western Australian 
provisions (and cases if relevant) will also be referred to. 
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then turns to the issue of how the streams interrelate in the same case and 
considers the two views that have been put forward. The first is that the 
streams of law are mutually exclusive methods of securing a manslaughter 
conviction, that is, if one stream applies then the other cannot. The alternative 
approach suggests that both streams of law are available. 
 
The discussion of these two views includes the impact that alternative 
possible fact scenarios within the same case may have on which view is to be 
preferred. It also canvasses the outcomes that flow from adopting each of the 
two approaches. It has been suggested that accepting the view that favours 
the concurrent application of both streams of law could improve the coherency 
of the criminal law and this claim is considered. Finally, the article concludes 
by suggesting which approach should be preferred. The legal arguments 
supporting the preferred view are considered, as are the reasons why some 
may have come to endorse the alternative approach. 
2 MANSLAUGHTER UNDER THE CODE5 
2.1 MANSLAUGHTER UNDER CHAPTER 28 
 
The first of the two streams of law6 through which the crime of manslaughter 
may be proven draws on Chapter 28 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).7 This 
stream deals with acts or conduct of an accused that cause another’s death in 
circumstances where that death is not an accident. 
 
Section 303 of the Code8 defines the crime of manslaughter: 
 
A person who unlawfully kills another under such circumstances as not 
to constitute murder is guilty of manslaughter. 
 
Accordingly, to secure such a conviction, the Crown must be able to establish 
that an unlawful killing took place, but be unable to demonstrate any of the 
further elements (such as intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm) that are 
necessary for a conviction for murder.9 The critical part of proving that an 
unlawful killing has taken place is being able to show that the accused caused 
the death of that other person. This requirement arises out of s 293,10 which 
defines “killing”: 
 
                                            
5 This article does not consider cases where provocation (Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 304; 
Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 281) or diminished responsibility (Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 
304A) are relied upon to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter. 
6 These different streams are explained in some detail in R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348 at [13] 
(Thomas JA). 
7 R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348 at [13]. See also Criminal Code 1913 (WA), ch 28. 
8 Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 280. 
9 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 302. In Western Australia, the Crown could attempt to show 
either wilful murder or murder: see Criminal Code 1913 (WA), ss 278, 279. See also the 
different elements of infanticide: Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s281A. 
10 See also Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 270. 
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Except as hereinafter set forth, any person who causes the death of 
another, directly or indirectly, by any means whatever, is deemed to 
have killed that other person. 
 
In Royall v The Queen,11 the High Court held that the test for causation at 
common law is whether the act or conduct is a substantial or significant cause 
of death, or substantially contributed to the death.12 Despite a suggestion in 
an early Queensland case that the reference to causing death “directly or 
indirectly” in s 293 might “connote perhaps a wider operative causal 
connection than was required by the common law”,13 it is now clear that the 
test applied in Queensland is the same as at common law. This test has been 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal in a series of cases including R v Lowrie and 
Ross,14 R v Sherrington and Kuchler15 and R v Carter.16  
 
McPherson JA in Carter outlines the position:17 
 
[6] … In consequence, courts in Queensland acting under the Code 
have applied to killing and causing death the meaning that was 
ascribed to those expressions at common law in Royall v The Queen 
(1991) 172 CLR 378. See, for example, Lowrie & Ross (1999) 106 A 
Crim R 565, 570-571; and R v Sherrington [2001] QCA 105 §4. 
 
[7] In Royall v The Queen … [a]fter referring to cases in which there 
“may be no single cause of the death of the deceased”, Deane and 
Dawson JJ went on to say (172 CLR 378, 411): 
“but if the accused’s conduct is a substantial or significant cause 
of death that will be sufficient, given the requisite intent, to 
sustain a conviction for murder. It is for the jury to determine 
whether the connexion between the conduct of the accused and 
the death of the deceased was sufficient to attribute causal 
responsibility to the accused.” 
 
In the same case Toohey and Gaudron JJ, after saying that the jury 
must be told that they need to reach a conclusion as to what caused 
the deceased’s death, said (172 CLR 378, 423): 
“That does not mean that the jury must be able to isolate a 
single cause of death; there may be more than one such cause 
… In that event it is inevitable that the jury will concentrate their 
attention on whether an act of the accused substantially 
contributed to the death.” 
… 
 
                                            
11 (1991) 172 CLR 378.  
12 (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 398 (Brennan J), 411 (Deane and Dawson JJ), 423 (Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ), 441 (McHugh J). 
13 Humphries (Vera) v R [1943] St R Qd 156 at 170 (Philp J). 
14 [2000] 2 Qd R 529. 
15 [2001] QCA 105. 
16 [2003] QCA 515. 
17 [2003] QCA 515 at [6]-[8]. 
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[8] From this, it will be seen that, while Toohey and Gaudron JJ spoke 
of an act “substantially contributing” to the death, Deane and Dawson 
JJ referred to conduct that was a “substantial or significant” cause of 
death. Their Honours appear to have used those expressions not with 
the intention of differentiating between them, but, in the context in 
which their observations were made, as synonyms… 
 
In addition to the Crown proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 
has killed another person, it must also be able to show that the killing was 
unlawful. This is required by s 29118 which provides: 
  
It is unlawful to kill any person unless such killing is authorized or 
justified or excused by law. 
 
Two excuses that are commonly raised in manslaughter cases are found in s 
23: the excuses of act independent of will19 and accident.20 The relevant part 
of that section, s 23(1), provides:21 
 
Subject to the express provisions of this Code relating to negligent acts 
and omissions, a person is not criminally responsible for–  
(a) an act or omission that occurs independently of the exercise of 
the person’s will; or 
(b) an event that occurs by accident. 
 
So, for example, if the accused raises the excuse of accident, the Crown is 
required to exclude that excuse by proving that the death was either intended, 
foreseen or it was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the accused’s 
conduct.22 A failure by the Crown to negate accident means that the killing is 
not unlawful and the accused is therefore not criminally responsible for the 
death. 
2.2 MANSLAUGHTER THROUGH CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE: CHAPTER 27 
 
The second stream of law addresses those deaths that occur due to the 
criminal negligence of the accused, and draws on the provisions of Chapter 
27 of the Code.23 These provisions impose a range of duties relating to the 
preservation of human life. They do not, however, create separate offences, 
rather they feed into the provisions that create offences against the person, 
including manslaughter.24 To prove that an accused is guilty of manslaughter 
based on criminal negligence, the Crown must prove three elements beyond 
reasonable doubt:25 
                                            
18 Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 268. 
19 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 23(1)(a); Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 23 (first paragraph). 
20 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 23(1)(b); Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 23 (first paragraph). 
21 Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 23 (first paragraph). 
22 R v Taiters; ex parte Attorney-General [1997] 1 Qd R 333 at 338; Kaporonovski v The 
Queen (1973) 133 CLR 209 at 231. 
23 R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348 at [13]. See also Criminal Code 1913 (WA), ch 27. 
24 R v Morgan [1999] QCA 348, [13]; Kenny RG, An Introduction to Criminal Law in 
Queensland and Western Australia (6th ed, Butterworths, 2004) p 128. 
25 Queensland Supreme and District Courts Benchbook (2004) [85.1]. 
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• A duty of care was owed; 
• That duty was breached; and 
• That breach of duty caused the death of another. 
2.2.1 The Duties 
 
Section 28926 is the most commonly invoked duty in manslaughter cases and 
will be used to illustrate the law by way of example in this article. It provides 
that: 
 
It is the duty of every person who has in the person’s charge or under 
the person’s control anything, whether living or inanimate, and whether 
moving or stationary, of such a nature that in the absence of care or 
precaution in its use or management, the life, safety, or health of any 
person may be endangered, to use reasonable care and take 
reasonable precautions to avoid such danger, and the person is held to 
have caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any 
person by reason of any omission to perform that duty. 
 
Accordingly, for a person to owe a duty under s 289, the Crown must prove 
that:  
• The accused had a thing in his or her charge or under his or her 
control; and 
• The absence of care or precaution in the use or management of that 
thing might endanger the life, health or safety of another.27 
 
While there has been some controversy over the scope of s 289, it appears 
that the provision does not require an object or thing to be inherently 
dangerous. Rather it is the dangerous manner in which an object is used that 
triggers the duty imposed by this provision.28 As a result, s 289 has been held 
to be applicable where objects such as a pencil29 and a meat preservative30 
were used dangerously.31 It has even been suggested by one academic 
commentator, Edelman, that “[a] fist has the same potential for harm, if used 
in a dangerous manner, as meat preservative or a pencil”, and could therefore 
give rise to a duty under s 289.32 While this argument may have some 
attraction for reasons discussed below, circumstances of direct or intentional 
personal violence, such as a blow with a fist, are unlikely to trigger the 
operation of this provision. 
 
                                            
26 The Western Australian equivalent is Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 266. 
27 These elements are based on the judgment of Atkinson J in R v Stott and van Embden 
[2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 324. 
28 O’Regan RS, “Dangerous Things and Criminal Liability under the Griffith Code” (1995) 19 
Crim LJ 128.  
29 R v Dabelstein [1966] Qd R 411. 
30 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456. 
31 See Pacino v R (1998) 105 A Crim R 309 where four dogs were regarded as being capable 
of falling within Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 266. 
32 Edelman JJ, “Preventing Intentional ‘Accidents’: Manslaughter, Criminal Negligence and 
Section 23 of the Criminal Codes” (1998) 22 Crim LJ 71 at 73-4. 
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One of the major difficulties with s 289 is ascertaining precisely when it 
applies, or when it would be more appropriate for a jury to be directed without 
reference to the criminal negligence provisions. In R v Hodgetts and 
Jackson,33 Thomas J discussed various situations in which the provision 
would and would not be applicable.34  Where the injury was inflicted by a car 
or other vehicle, Thomas J suggested that s 289 would clearly be applicable.35  
Conversely, in circumstances involving “direct personal violence by blows to 
the body” s 289 would not be applicable, and the alternative stream of law 
would cover that situation instead.36 Other factors that suggest that s 289 
would not apply include whether the contact made by the accused was willed 
and whether there was an intention to cause harm.37  
 
As Thomas J notes, particular difficulties arise where weapons are used.38  
Where the victim is the intended target of the weapon it becomes a situation 
of deliberate personal violence and hence s 289 will not apply.39 However, the 
provision would be applicable where the victim is not the target (for example, 
in the case of accidental firearm discharge) or where the accused fired to 
frighten the victim although aiming to miss, but did in fact cause injury.40 
Although some difficulty remains in determining the applicability of s 289, 
Thomas J suggested, as a basic test, considering whether the Crown case 
was essentially one of negligence as distinct from direct personal violence.41 
2.2.2 Breach of Duty 
 
Having established that the accused owed a duty under s 289, the question 
then becomes whether that duty has been breached. Although the provision 
refers to “reasonable care” and “reasonable precautions”, the standard of care 
required in cases of criminal negligence is lower than for civil negligence. An 
accused person will only be in breach of one of these duties where “the 
negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation 
between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others 
as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct deserving 
punishment.”42   
2.2.3 Causation 
 
                                            
33 [1990] 1 Qd R 456. 
34 [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 461-462. 
35 [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 461-462. 
36 [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 462. Although note that Edelman argues that the provision is broad 
enough to encompass situations where deliberate or intentional violence is inflicted: Edelman, 
n 32 at 74-76.  However, he acknowledges at 74 that this conclusion “seems to sit 
uncomfortably with the conception that this is a provision relating to ‘negligence’”. 
37 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 462. 
38 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 462. 
39 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 462. See also R v Auld [1997] QCA 202. 
40 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 462. 
41 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 462. 
42 R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 at 11-12. This distinction between criminal and civil 
negligence was adopted in Queensland in R v Scarth [1945] St R Qd 38. 
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Where an accused breaches one of these duties, the result is that he or she is 
deemed to have “caused any consequences which result to the life or health 
of any person”.43 This phrase requires that a causal connection must be 
demonstrated between the criminal negligence and the death. Thomas J in 
Hodgetts and Jackson made this clear saying: “… criminal negligence does 
not exist in a vacuum. It must be criminal negligence that causes the death”.44 
As was the case in the first stream of law relating to manslaughter, there is no 
need to demonstrate that the criminal negligence was the sole cause of the 
death. It is sufficient if the omission to perform the duty “contributed 
substantially or significantly to the death”.45 If causation can be proven, then 
the accused has killed a person and will be liable for conviction for 
manslaughter.46 
 
However, the issue of causation only arises if the accused has breached one 
of the duties contained in Chapter 27. This is because if the duty is not 
breached, then the person is not deemed to have caused the consequences 
of their criminal negligence, which in this case, is the death of another. 
Because there is no causation, there has not been a killing47 so the need for 
authorisation, justification or excuse48 does not arise.49  
2.2.4 Unavailability of Section 23 
 
One further important difference between the two streams of law is that where 
the Crown relies on criminal negligence to found a manslaughter conviction, 
the accused is prevented from raising the excuses contained in s 23.50 This is 
because that section is “[s]ubject to the express provisions relating to 
negligent acts and omissions”.51 Hence there is no obligation, having proved 
criminal negligence beyond reasonable doubt, for the Crown to exclude these 
excuses. So, for example, in relation to the excuse of accident, the Crown 
does not have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the death was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the accused’s conduct.52 
                                            
43 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 289. 
44 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 463. 
45 Queensland Supreme and District Courts Benchbook (2004) [85.3], citing Royall v The 
Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; see also R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 463 
(Thomas J), cf 479 (Ambrose J). 
46 Although note that (rarely) the offence of murder may also be committed through criminal 
negligence: R v Macdonald and Macdonald [1904] St R Qd 151. 
47 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 293; Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 270. 
48 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 291; Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 268. 
49 Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 510; R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd 
R 456 at 461. 
50 Callaghan v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 115 at 119; R v Van den Bemd [1995] 1 Qd R 401 
at 403. 
51 See Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 23(1). 
52 Note, however, that questions of foreseeability normally raised by the excuse of accident 
will nevertheless be relevant when considering whether the accused was criminally negligent. 
This is because a duty to take reasonable precautions only arises in relation to dangers that 
are reasonably foreseeable. In this way, criminal negligence “will necessarily involve an 
evaluation of the foreseeability of serious harm”: R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 
456 at 463-464. See also Edelman’s critique of this position: Edelman, n 32 at 79-80. 
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3 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO STREAMS 
3.1 ONE STREAM OR TWO? 
 
Having identified the two streams of law under which a conviction for 
manslaughter may be secured, the issue arises as to how they relate to, or 
interact with, each other. In particular, one question raised is whether the 
Crown can seek to rely on both streams of law as alternatives in the same 
case. It is clear that the Crown may put both streams of law to a jury in the 
same case where the evidence permits a jury to conclude as a matter of fact 
that the death occurred in different ways. An example is the case of R v Kidd53 
where an accused was convicted of manslaughter after a scuffle involving a 
knife resulted in another’s death. There was conflicting evidence as to 
whether the accused was in control of the knife at the time of its entry into the 
accused and the jury would have been entitled to reach a conclusion either 
way. The trial judge directed the jury in relation to the excuse of accident54 but 
did not give directions as to criminal negligence under s 289.55 
 
McPherson JA and Mackenzie J allowed an appeal against conviction56 
because directions as to both streams of law should have been given.57 The 
evidence at trial left it open to the jury to conclude that the accused had 
control of the knife, but also that he did not.58 If the accused did have control 
at the time that the knife entered the victim, then s 289 would apply so the jury 
should have been directed in terms of criminal negligence. However, if there 
was no such control, s 289 would not apply and the direction should have 
been given in relation to the stream of law under Chapter 28, with a 
discussion of the excuses under s 23 as appropriate. The potential for a jury 
to reach different conclusions as to the way in which the death occurred 
required directions as to both streams of law.  
 
The case of R v Stott and van Embden59 provides another illustration of two 
different factual scenarios giving rise to directions on the alternative streams 
of law.60 In this case the appellants were tried for murder but convicted of the 
manslaughter of an associate who died from a heroin overdose. On one 
possible view of the evidence, the accused had control of a dangerous thing 
                                            
53 [2001] QCA 536. 
54 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 23(1)(b). 
55 The trial judge also failed to give directions in relation to the excuse of act independent of 
will (Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 23(1)(a)) which McPherson JA and Mackenzie J held should 
have been given: R v Kidd [2001] QCA 536 at [10] and [22] respectively. McMurdo P (who 
approached the matter differently from the other two judges as discussed below) also noted 
that such a direction may be necessary on the retrial: R v Kidd [2001] QCA 536 at [1]. 
56 The matter before the Court of Appeal was an application for an extension of time within 
which to appeal against conviction and sentence. McPherson JA and Mackenzie J took the 
unusual step of actually allowing the appeal, whereas McMurdo P ordered only that time 
within which to appeal be extended. It seems, however, that Her Honour was of same view as 
to the merits of the appeal as the other two judges: R v Kidd [2001] QCA 536 at [1]-[2]. 
57 McMurdo P also acknowledged that the failure to direct as to s 289 meant that it “seems 
inevitable that the appeal in due course must be allowed”: R v Kidd [2001] QCA 536 at [1]. 
58 R v Kidd [2001] QCA 536 at [19]-[21] (Mackenzie J). 
59 [2002] 2 Qd R 313. 
60 [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 321 (McPherson JA). 
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(a syringe containing heroin), which one of them (while the other assisted) 
injected into the victim, not intending him to die. This would trigger s 289, 
making criminal negligence the route to conviction for manslaughter.  
 
An alternative fact scenario involved the accused supplying the victim with the 
syringe containing the heroin, which the victim himself injected into his own 
bloodstream. In these circumstances, a majority of the Queensland Court of 
Appeal held that the accused no longer had control of the syringe and 
therefore s 289 would have no application.61 Instead, the general principles of 
causation would apply, with the Crown having to disprove the excuse of 
accident. Thus, on appeal against conviction, the majority of the Queensland 
Court of Appeal held that directions were correctly given on both streams of 
law with the jury applying the relevant one depending on which factual 
scenario it accepted.62 
 
Although the law is clear in cases where the evidence permits a jury to make 
different findings of fact, there has been some confusion as to whether both of 
these alternative streams of law are open if the evidence is more settled. 
Take, for example, a case where there is no doubt that an accused was in 
control of a dangerous thing at the time when an injury resulting in death was 
inflicted through a lack of care. In this situation, two views have been 
advanced. 
 
The first is that the two streams of law are mutually exclusive alternatives. In 
other words, if the facts are such that they should be dealt with under s 289, 
then the alternative stream of law that could result in a manslaughter 
conviction is not available. This was the view of the High Court in 1964 in 
Evgeniou v The Queen.63 In that case, the accused was convicted of 
manslaughter after killing a pedestrian by driving a car at reckless speed and 
with insufficient attention to dangers on the road. The trial judge (who heard 
the case without a jury) concluded that he was entitled to found this conviction 
on both streams of law, that is, that the accused was guilty both of criminal 
negligence and that he unlawfully killed another in circumstances where an 
excuse under s 23 was unavailable.64 
 
The High Court65 affirmed the finding of guilt by the trial judge but found that 
the he had misdirected himself in considering that a potential basis for that 
manslaughter conviction was an unlawful killing that was not excused under s 
                                            
61 [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 321 (McPherson JA, with whom Muir J agreed); cf Atkinson J at 324-
325. 
62 Atkinson J agreed with McPherson JA and Muir J that the appeal against conviction should 
be dismissed but thought that a direction as to criminal negligence under s 289 should also 
have been given in relation to the second potential fact scenario: [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 324-
325. However, as this additional direction would have only added another potential ground for 
conviction, Atkinson J agreed that the appeal should be dismissed: [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 325. 
63 (1964) 37 ALJR 508. 
64 The decision was based on the provisions of Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) which were adopted 
in the then Papua and New Guinea.  
65 A majority of three (McTiernan, Menzies and Windeyer JJ) to two (Taylor and Owen JJ 
dissenting) upheld the finding of guilt by the trial judge but all of the judges were of the view 
that the law in relation to ss 23 and 289 was not applied correctly. 
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23. McTiernan and Menzies JJ state clearly that the only basis upon which the 
accused could have been convicted was criminal negligence:66 
 
“The Code, as we construe its relevant provisions in the light of 
authority, does mean that a motor car driver whose omission to use 
reasonable care in its management amounting to criminal negligence 
results in the death of another is guilty of manslaughter; it does not 
mean that a motor car driver whose omission to use reasonable care in 
its management not amounting to criminal negligence results in the 
death of another can be found guilty of manslaughter unless excused 
under s 23 ... Accordingly, there was no basis here on which the 
accused could have been held guilty of unlawfully killing the deceased 
man except criminal negligence arising out of a breach of the duty 
imposed by s 289.” 
 
That these streams of law are mutually exclusive was also the view of 
Thomas J in Hodgetts and Jackson.67 Subsequent Queensland Court of 
Appeal decisions, such as Stott and van Embden (although only a majority 
decision on this point)68 and Kidd,69 have also taken a similar approach. This 
view is also shared by a leading Queensland criminal law text.70 
 
Despite this authority, there is, however, an alternative view that has been 
advanced and that is that the Crown may put both streams of law to a jury 
even when different factual scenarios are not potentially open. The thrust of 
this approach is stated by Atkinson J in Stott and van Embden:71 
 
“This consequence [Her Honour is referring to an inconsistency in the 
law] depends, however, on the two methods of attributing criminal 
responsibility being mutually exclusive. There is authority, however, 
that the same set of facts can give rise to both types of direction being 
given to the jury. [Her Honour footnotes the cases of Griffiths v R, R v 
Morgan, R v Murray, and R v Guise.] It is appropriate in some 
circumstances to give to the jury a direction that they may find an 
accused guilty of manslaughter by reason of criminal negligence in the 
control of a dangerous thing under s 289; or because the act was willed 
or voluntary and the death did not occur by accident, that is, it was a 
foreseen or foreseeable result of that act in the sense in which this 
defence is explained in Kaporonovski v The Queen and R v Taiters; ex 
parte Attorney-General. These are alternative routes to conviction for 
manslaughter.” 
 
                                            
66 (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 510. See also 511 (Taylor J), 513 (Owen J). 
67 [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 459-461. 
68 [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 321-322 (McPherson JA, with whom Muir J agreed). McPherson JA, 
Muir and Atkinson JJ all concurred in dismissing the appeals against conviction but Atkinson J 
took a different view in relation to this issue which is discussed further below. 
69 [2001] QCA 536. 
70 Kenny, n 24, p 131. 
71 [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 323. 
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Particular weight was given by Atkinson J to the High Court decision of 
Griffiths v R,72 which contained a suggestion that both streams of law were 
open to the Crown.73 Griffiths involved the shooting death of a 16 year old boy 
by his best friend, although the evidence at trial did not conclusively establish 
whether the fatal shot had been fired intentionally or negligently. The majority 
of Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ stated that:74 
 
“The crime of manslaughter can be committed either by a voluntary act 
which causes death in circumstances which do not amount to murder 
or by criminal negligence.”  
 
This is also the approach taken by an academic commentator, Edelman, who 
argues that both streams of law are available to the prosecution as alternative 
routes to conviction for manslaughter.75 He too relies heavily on the Griffiths 
decision and the quote outlined above.76 
3.2 INCOHERENCY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
A consideration that could be relevant to deciding which approach should be 
preferred is the extent to which it improves the structure and coherency of the 
criminal law. The difficulty that arises in this situation, however, is that both 
views create inconsistencies within the law that are hard to justify. 
 
The major difficulty caused by accepting that the streams of law relating to 
manslaughter are mutually exclusive is one of differing standards of proof. 
This difficulty is expressed by McPherson JA in Stott and van Embden:77 
 
“I am bound to say that it is not at all satisfactory that criminal 
responsibility should be left to depend on such fine distinctions. It has 
the consequence that, if death is caused by the use of “a dangerous 
thing”, the prosecution must satisfy the higher standard of proof of 
criminal negligence required under s 289; whereas if it is caused by 
using hands, feet or other body parts, or some weaponless method of 
causing death, the prosecution need only satisfy the objective standard 
of reasonable foresight of the possibility of death … It is, as the present 
case illustrates, plainly undesirable that there should be differing 
criteria of criminal responsibility for negligent conduct according to 
whether the case is or is not capable of being brought within the literal 
wording of s 289 of the Code.” 
 
His Honour’s point can be elaborated upon as follows. If s 289 applies to a 
given situation, the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused’s conduct was so blameworthy that it warrants a finding of criminal 
negligence. This is a difficult task for the Crown because, as discussed above, 
                                            
72 (1994) 125 ALR 545. 
73 R v Stott and van Embden [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 324. 
74 Griffiths v R (1994) 125 ALR 545 at 547. 
75 See for example, Edelman, n 32 at 75-76, 79.  
76 Edelman, n 32 at 75-76. 
77 [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 321-322. See also 322 (Atkinson J). 
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it requires that the accused’s conduct demonstrates “such disregard for the 
life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct 
deserving punishment.”78 By contrast, under the other stream of law, having 
shown an unlawful killing, the Crown would only have to exclude the excuse 
of accident by showing that the victim’s death was reasonably foreseeable.79 
This stream of law represents an easier route to conviction for the 
prosecution. 
 
This difference between the two streams and the standard of proof required is 
particularly problematic because the stream that is applicable can depend on 
matters that are arguably irrelevant to the appropriateness of imposing 
criminal responsibility. For example, a different stream of law could be 
triggered as being applicable simply because the killing involved a dangerous 
thing rather than a hand. Indeed, the problems that can be encountered when 
characterising whether s 289 should apply to a given fact scenario have 
already been highlighted.  
 
The alternative approach, to permit both streams of law relating to 
manslaughter to be relied upon in the same set of facts, would remove this 
inconsistency.80 If both streams of law were open, the easier route to 
conviction for the Crown, that is, by proving that the death was reasonably 
foreseeable, could be relied upon in all such cases hence the different 
standard of proof would not arise. However, such an approach creates 
another difficulty in that it could lead to the finding of criminal responsibility in 
circumstances where arguably it is not appropriate to do so. 
 
This point will be made by drawing on a factual scenario based on the case of 
Evgeniou v The Queen,81 but with modifications to illustrate more clearly the 
argument being made. In that case, although all of the judges of the High 
Court disagreed that both streams of law relating to manslaughter could be 
relied upon to found a conviction for manslaughter arising from driving a car, a 
majority of the Court agreed with trial judge that the accused had been 
criminally negligent. For the purposes of this argument, it will be assumed that 
the accused in that case is now no longer driving in a manner that is criminally 
negligent, but rather only negligent in the civil sense due to an excess of 
speed that falls short of recklessness.  
 
If the evidence revealed this set of facts, the trial judge in Evgeniou (who 
heard the matter without a jury) would not have been entitled to convict the 
accused under s 28982 because he had not been guilty of criminal negligence. 
However, it would have been open to the trial judge to convict the accused of 
manslaughter if, as the argument goes, both streams of law could be relied 
                                            
78 R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 at 11-12. 
79 Cf Edelman, n 32 at 77-78, where he argues that s 289 provides an easier route to 
conviction for manslaughter than excluding accident (although this view is based partly on the 
inclusion of s 23(1A) of Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) which is not replicated in Criminal Code 
1913 (WA)). 
80 R v Stott and van Embden [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 323 (Atkinson J).  
81 (1964) 37 ALJR 508. 
82 For the purposes of this argument, the offences contained in s 328A of the Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld) and s 59 of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) are not considered. 
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upon by the Crown. Indeed, if confronted with the modified fact scenario 
proposed, it is suggested that the Crown could exclude the excuse of accident 
because striking a pedestrian when driving at high speed is clearly reasonably 
foreseeable. The possibility of such an outcome is not remote or 
speculative;83 indeed these sorts of events happen frequently in our society.  
 
The problem that arises, however, with such an outcome is that the accused 
has been convicted of manslaughter for careless conduct in circumstances 
where he has clearly not been criminally negligent. This creates its own 
inconsistency within the criminal law because to permit a finding of guilt for 
manslaughter for carelessness that falls short of criminal negligence in the 
scenario proposed is contrary to long standing authority.84  
 
Accordingly, both of the alternative approaches to this issue creates problems 
for the criminal law, leaving a choice of two undesirable options. Having found 
limited assistance from reviewing the outcomes of each of these alternative 
approaches, a preferred view is now outlined with some explanation as to how 
the possibility of an alternative view came into being. 
4 A PREFERRED APPROACH? 
 
It is suggested that the preferred approach to the interrelation of the two 
streams of law relating to manslaughter is that they are mutually exclusive. If s 
289 applies to a particular fact situation, then the alternative stream of law 
dealing with the excuse of accident is not available, and vice versa. Further, it 
is not open to the Crown to choose which mutually exclusive stream of law it 
wishes to rely upon.85 Indeed, if the Crown sought to argue that an accused 
was guilty because the death was reasonably foreseeable under s 23 in 
circumstances where s 289 was the appropriate provision for the jury to 
consider, the trial judge should direct the jury in terms of criminal 
negligence.86 
 
The critical factor in reaching the conclusion that the two streams are mutually 
exclusive is the opening words of s 23: “Subject to the express provisions of 
this Code relating to negligent acts and omissions…”. There is long standing 
authority that says that these introductory words mean that s 23 has no 
application to situations that give rise to the duty created by s 289 because 
that provision is one that expressly relates to negligent acts and omissions.87 
If, therefore, a specific situation occurred in which an accused’s guilt or 
innocence must be decided by reference to s 289, there can be no room for 
                                            
83 R v Taiters; ex parte Attorney-General [1997] 1 Qd R 333 at 338. 
84 For example, R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8; R v Scarth [1945] St R Qd 38; Callaghan 
v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 115; Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508. 
85 Cf Edelman, n 32 at 73, 75-76. 
86 For example, R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456. 
87 Some of the important cases in this long standing line of authority include Callaghan v The 
Queen (1952) 85 CLR 115 at 119; Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 510 
(McTiernan and Menzies JJ), 511 (Taylor J), 513 (Owen J); R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 
1 Qd R 456 at 459-460 (Thomas J); R v Stott and van Embden [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 321 
(McPherson J). 
 14
the operation of s 23 (and that stream of law relating to manslaughter). 
Accordingly, the two streams of law must be mutually exclusive and only one 
stream can apply to a given set of facts. 
 
How then did the alternative view come to be put forward? It is suggested that 
the divergence of opinion on the availability of the two streams of law relating 
to manslaughter is linked with two issues: the preliminary matters clarified 
earlier about alternative fact scenarios and the High Court decision of 
Griffiths. As noted above, in Griffiths, the majority of Brennan, Dawson and 
Gaudron JJ stated that:88 
 
“The crime of manslaughter can be committed either by a voluntary act 
which causes death in circumstances which do not amount to murder 
or by criminal negligence.”  
 
This is an accurate statement of the law and there are a number of other 
cases in which it has been appropriate to direct a jury as to both streams of 
law, some of which are cited by Atkinson J in Stott and van Embden.89 
However, those directions as to both streams of law were only justified 
because those cases involved the possibility of the jury finding different fact 
scenarios that raised both streams. For example, in Griffiths, although the gun 
was clearly a dangerous thing, there was no conclusive evidence as to how 
the gun went off. In particular, the evidence did not reveal whether the 
accused was in control of the gun or not at the relevant time. For this reason, 
directions as to both streams of law relating to manslaughter were necessary 
to guide the jury depending on what findings of fact they made in relation to 
how the death occurred. 
 
It seems, however, that the case of Griffiths may have been given a wider 
application and the above statement was relied upon to conclude that both 
streams of law are available on the same set of facts. For example, it seems 
that this may have been the view that Edelman took of this case. After 
discussing the mutually exclusive approach taken by Thomas J in Hodgetts 
and Jackson, Edelman then turns to consider the later High Court case which 
he regards to be inconsistent with Hodgetts and Jackson.90 As the most 
recent High Court authority on the issue, it may have been concluded that this 
wider approach represented the latest statement of the law. Griffiths did, of 
course, state that both streams of law should have been directed upon, but in 
circumstances where a jury was called upon to consider evidence that left 
both streams open on the facts. 
 
Although a preferred approach has been put forward, that being that the two 
streams of law are mutually exclusive, the problem of differing standards of 
proof for each stream of law that was discussed above remains. A factual 
scenario that falls within s 289 requires the Crown to prove the high standard 
of gross negligence, but a different set of facts that falls within the other 
                                            
88 (1994) 125 ALR 545 at 547. 
89 [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 323. The examples given in addition to Griffiths are: R v Morgan 
[1999] QCA 348; R v Murray [1999] QCA 341; R v Guise (1998) 101 A Crim R 143. 
90 Edelman, n 32 at 75. 
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stream of law only requires that the Crown exclude the excuse of accident by 
showing that the victim’s death was reasonably foreseeable. As McPherson 
JA in Stott and van Embden commented:  
 
“It is … plainly undesirable that there should be differing criteria of 
criminal responsibility for negligent conduct according to whether the 
case is or is not capable of being brought within the literal wording of s 
289 of the Code.”91 
 
Judicial resolution of this problem is unlikely because it is embedded in the 
structure of how the Code regulates criminal negligence. Derrington J in 
Hodgetts and Jackson described the Code as being “not logically 
symmetrical” and points to a gap in the law relating to criminal negligence not 
involving dangerous things: 
 
“While s 289 has the effect of rendering a person liable in respect of 
criminal negligence relating to the control of dangerous things, there is 
no corresponding section relating to criminal negligence generally, 
particularly in respect of acts not involving dangerous things.”92 
 
Arguably all liability for careless behaviour that results in the death of another 
would be more appropriately determined in accordance with the established 
principles of criminal negligence, regardless of how the death was caused. 
One solution to this problem might be to correct the unsymmetrical nature of 
the Code. This could be achieved by the inclusion of a more general provision 
that imposes liability for criminally negligent behaviour that causes death, 
regardless of how that death was caused, in addition to the existing duty 
provisions in Chapter 27. This would result in a uniform approach to criminally 
negligent behaviour so that all such conduct would be regulated in the same 
way. Deaths caused other than by criminal negligence would continue to be 
regulated by the other stream of law (under Chapter 28) which permits an 
accused to raise the defence of accident. 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the existence of a contrary view, it is suggested that the preferred 
approach is that the two streams of law relating to manslaughter are mutually 
exclusive options in relation to a given set of facts. Directions may be given to 
a jury to consider both the law relating to acts or conduct that cause death in 
circumstances not amounting to accident and criminal negligence in the same 
case. However, such an approach depends on that case raising alternative 
fact scenarios that warrant directions being given on both streams of law. 
 
Although this aspect of the law should be regarded as relatively settled, the 
state of the law remains problematic. Indeed, a common theme in the 
judgments that have discussed these provisions has been the unsatisfactory 
                                            
91 [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 322.  
92 R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 470 (Derrington J). 
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state of the both the Code and the case law.93 The current position leads to 
some incoherence in the criminal law in that it can give rise to different 
standards of proof. This problem of different standards is exacerbated by the 
fact that characterisation of a case as falling within one or other of the streams 
can itself be problematic. One solution suggested in this article was to include 
in the Code a wider duty provision that imposes liability for criminal negligence 
more generally. This would mean that all criminally negligent behaviour would 
be regulated by the same principles of law. 
                                            
93 “The conclusions to which the members of the High Court came in Callaghan and Evgeniou 
(as their Honours acknowledged) do not follow from an entirely satisfactory construction of the 
Code”: R v Hodgetts and Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 460 (Thomas J), see also 471-472 
(Derrington J). See also Evgeniou v The Queen (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 510 (McTiernan and 
Menzies JJ); R v Stott and van Embden [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 321-322 (McPherson JA), 322 
(Atkinson J). For some different views as to how these problems with the Code arose, see R v 
Stott and van Embden [2002] 2 Qd R 313 at 319, 322 (McPherson JA); R v Hodgetts and 
Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456 at 470-471 (Derrington J); Edelman, n 32 at 80. 
